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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. ; 
DARRELL LAWRENCE WESSENDORF, : 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 880186 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to 78-2a-3(f) of Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the conviction of appellant of 
the crime of manslaughter, a second degree felony, in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court in and for the County of Washington, by 
the court sitting without a jury. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. THE DEATH OF THE CHILD WAS CAUSED BY ACCIDENTAL MEANS 
AND NOT HOMICIDE BY APPELLANT, BUT AT MOST WAS A NEGLIGENT 
HOMICIDE AND NOT MANSLAUGHTER. 
A. The Death of the Child Was Accidental and Not 
Homicide. 
B. The Standard to Determine Intent of the Actor, 
Applicable In This Case Should Be a Subjective Standard 
and Not an Objective Standard. 
II. THE DEATH OF THE CHILD WAS CAUSED BY THE INTERVENING 
TREATMENT OB NEGLIGENCE OF THE TREATING PHYSICIAN AND SAID 
NEGLIGENCE SHOULD BE A DEFENSE TO APPELLANT. 
A. The Treating Physicians Underprescribed Antivenin 
and Said Lack of Antivenin Was the Proximate Cause of 
the Death of the Victim. 
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B. The state Did Not Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
That the Cause of Death Was Not as a Result of Improper 
Intubation of the Victim by the Treating Personnel, 
Which Resulted in Her Death 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
Section 76-5-205 (See Addendum) 
Section 76-5-206 (See Addendum) 
Section 76-2-103 (See Addendum) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant-appellant was charged with 2nd Degree Murder, 
a first degree felony, arising out of the death of-Stevie 
Kirkwood, a two-and-one-half year old female child, bitten by a 
rattlesnake. 
Appellant was tried before the court sitting without a 
jury. 
The trial judge found appellant not guilty of 2nd 
degree murder, but guilty of manslaughter, a 2nd degree felony 
and appellant was sentenced to the statutory penalty of 1 year to 
15 years in the Utah State Penitentiary. 
FACTS 
On the morning of May 7, 1987 the appellant was picked 
up by Willis Kelton at the heme of Jeri Ann and Marshall 
Kirkwood, in LaVerkin, Utah. 
Appellant ostensibly rented a room upstairs in the 
Kirkwood home, but as time passed, in actuality, the relationship 
between him and Jeri Ann Kirkwood developed into an intimate one 
with him occupying her room, with her, whenever her husband, a 
truck driver, was away from the home. (T.380-383) 
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On the 7th, Kelton and appellant departed for Cedar 
City, but had not gone tar when they spotted a snake by the side 
of the road. Mr. Kelton stopped and they went back and caught 
the snake, a rattlesnake, and took it back to the Kirkwood home. 
This happened about 10:00 a.m. Appellant handled the 
snake for a time, then put it in a gunny sack and hung it' in a 
tree, asking Mrs. Kirkwood to move the sack to shade if the sun 
got on it. Then Kelton and appellant again departed for Cedar 
City, returning about 12:30 to 1:00 p.m. In the interim, Mrs.. 
Kirkwood went to St. George, returning about 3:00 p.m. (T.21) 
Upon returning from Cedar City, appellant spent about 
two hours taming the snake and allowing it to get used to being 
handled. He petted the snakef allowed it to crawl over and 
around him, and picked it up and handled it many times. (T.394, 
T.310) 
It was approximately 3:00 p.m. when Mrs. Kirkwood 
returned from St. George, about the time the neighborhood 
children were returning from school. By then, the appellant's 
handling of the snake had progressed to the stage where he was 
carrying the snake around his neck, kissing the snake's head, 
putting the snake down his pants, and generally handling the 
snake with no fear or concern that he might be bitten. (T.27, 
T.399) 
After a while, the appellant took the snake inside the 
home and into the bathroom where Stevie Kirkwood, the 2 year old 
daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Kirkwood, was playing with a kitten. (T. 
402) Kelton followed him in and Mrs. Kirkwood chose to enter 
3 
through a window in her bedroom. (T.400) Mrs. Kirkwood obtained 
a gun from her bedroom and went to the bathroom. (T.29) 
Stevie Kirkwood was in the bathroom playing with the 
kittens. Appellant was kneeling behind her and the snake wasf at 
least, partially resting on her shoulder. (T.29) Appellant was 
also supporting it with his hand preparatory to showing fiow a 
rattlesnake is "milked". (T.320) Mrs. Kirkwood panicked and 
said for him to get the snake off her daughter, all the while 
holding a gun. (T.29) Mrs. Kirkwood admitted considering 
shooting appellant, (T.30) and admitted threatening to shoot him, 
(T.59) He saw what he thought was something being thrown at him, 
turned abruptly and at that moment, for whatever reason, the 
snake bit Stevie on the shoulder. (T.404) 
Appellant peeled the snake's fangs out of the child's 
shoulder and immediately proceeded to lacerate the wound with his 
pocket-knife and to attempt to suck the venom from the wound. (T. 
405) 
Mrs. Kirkwood followed Kelton outside, who had been 
given the snake and shot it. (T.30, T.60) 
Thereafter a confused dispute and scuffle ensued, Mrs. 
Kirkwood claiming she was trying to get the child to take it to 
the hospital (T.30) and the appellant insisting he was trying to 
administer emergency first aid and get to his truck where he had 
a snakebite kit to further treat the bite. (T.405, T.409) 
A scuffle also developed between appellant and Kelton. 
Mrs. Kirkwood insisting it was the appellant trying to keep her 
from taking the child to the hospital (T.31) and appellant 
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insisting he himself wanted to go to the hospital with Mrs. 
Kirkwood and the child rather than Kelton, whom he thought was 
not as capable of safely driving as he was. (T. 412) 
The child was at the hospital 15 to 20 minutes after 
leaving LaVerkin. (T.33). Mrs. Kirkwood testified appellant 
delayed her departure tor 20 to 25 minutes. (T.34), but Kelton 
admitted he had testified at the preliminary hearing, held much 
closer to the time of the incident, that it had been 5 minutes or 
maybe less trom the time of the bite until they were on their way 
to St. George to the hospital. (T. 327) That would have been 20 
to 25 minutes that the child was at the hospital after the bite. 
The child, Stevie Kirkwood, was treated with a maximum 
of 1 and 1/2 vials of anti-venom medication. (T.195, T.509). 
Initially the child was diagnosed by the treating 
doctor to be improving, (T.108) then suddenly had a respiratory 
arrest and died. (T.108) 
The appellant, who was intimate with the child's mother 
considered the children of Jeri Kirkwood almost as if his own 
children. (T.39, T.383-385, T.453-4b5) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant was found not guilty of 2nd degree murder, 
but guilty of manslaughter, a 2nd degree felony and sentenced 
pursuant to statute to prison. 
The death of the child, Stevie Kirkwood was accidental, 
there was no intent to cause harm to said child by the appellant. 
Even if there was negligence on the part of appellant, 
the court, sitting without a jury, misinterpreted the law of the 
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State of Utah and applied an objective standard concerning the 
knowledge and intent of the appellant when it should have hmnn a 
subjective standard. 
Had the proper standard been applied, the most 
appellant could have been convicted of was negligent homicide, a 
Class A misdemeanor and not manslaughter, a 2nd degree felony. 
Furthermore, appellant should have been exonerated of 
responsibility for the death of the child because the treating 
physicians were, in fact, the actual cause of the death of said 
child, because they wrongfully and negligently drastically 
underprescribed and under-administered antivenin to the child 
when brought to the hospital for treatment, which was the actual 
cause of death rather than the initial bite by the snake. 
In addition, there was evidence that the child was 
improperly intubated by the treating physicians, and other 
personnel at the hospital and the State, which has the burden of 
proof, did not prove that said improper intubation was not the 
cause of death of the child. 
ARGUMENT 
While appellant had been originally charged with 
second degree murder, he was convicted of manslaughter by the 
court sitting without a jury. 
Appellant submits that it was error to convict him of 
manslaughter; that he should have been either accjuitted on the 
grounds that the death of the child was accidental, and/or 
because there was an intervening cause, but at most, appellant 
should have only been convicted of criminal negligence. 
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There was little or no dispute that appellant loved the 
deceased child, Stevie Kirkwood, as if she were his own child. 
The testimony of the mother (T.39), together with the testimony 
ot the appellant (T.383-385) and of a close friend and one-time 
foster parent of the appellant, Cloyd (Buck) Crofts, (T. 453-455) 
demonstrates that appellant was the paramour of the mother and 
dearly loved the child. Indeed, even the trial judge found, as a 
matter of fact, that in his opinion appellant"... loved Stevie 
Kirkwood; that he had genuine affection for other members of her 
family; that he had no desire or intent to harm her..." 
(Sentencing Transcript 5, lines 18-21 [See addendum]) 
It is with the above circumstance in mind that the 
statutes of Utah and the facts of this case must be considered. 
1. THE DEATH OF THE CHILD WAS CAUSED BY ACCIDENTAL 
MEANS AND NOT HOMICIDE BY APPELLANT, BUT AT MOST WAS A NEGLIGENT 
HOMICIDE AND NOT MANSLAUGHTER. 
A* The Death of the Child Was Accidental and Not 
Homicide. 
Appellant submits that the incident was purely and 
simply an accident and he should not have been convicted of any 
offense whatever. 
As stated in 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide, Section 112, page 
406: 
"Where it appears that a killing was 
unintentional, that the perpetrator acted 
with no wrongful purpose in doing the 
homicidal act, that it was done while he was 
engaged in a lawful enterprise, and that it 
was not the result of negligence, the 
homicide will be excused on the score of 
accident or misadventure. . . . Action 
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accompanied, not only with no intent to do 
harm, but also with a reasonable belief that 
no harm is possible, is clearly wanting in 
every essential element of crime." 
The facts as shown by the transcript and as will be 
referred to hereinafter with reference to other issues 
demonstrate this death to be purely accidental. 
But if appellant v/as deemed to be negligent, he should 
certainly not have been convicted of manslaughter. 
B. The Standard to Determine Intent of the Actor 
Applicable in this Case Should be a Subjective Standard and Not 
an Objective Standard. 
The court convicted appellant of manslaughter, as 
defined in Section 76-5-205 of Utah Code, presumably, subsection 
(a) thereof. 
Section 76-5-205 reads as follows: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances. 
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional 
disturbance does not include a condition 
resulting from mental illness as defined in 
Section 76-2-305. 
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or 
excuse under Subsection (a)(b), or the 
reasonable belief of the actor under 
Subsection (a)(c), shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under 
the then existing circumstances. 
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second 
degree. 
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The Negligent Homicide section, 76-5-206, reads as 
follows: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another, 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
Whether appellant is guilty of manslaughter or of 
negligent homicide depends, then, upon whether appellant caused 
the death of another (a), recklessly (manslaughter), or (b) with 
criminal negligence (Negligent Homicide). If he did neither, 
then, of course, he should have been acquitted. 
Appellant submits that the death of Stevie Kirkwood was 
indeed an accident, but if that accident was caused by the 
appellant's negligence, then he is guilty of no more than 
negligent homicide and not manslaughter as the trial court 
erroneously found. 
The definition of the elements of either manslaughter 
or negligent homicide are found in subparagraph (3) 
(manslaughter) or subparagraph (4), (negligent homicide), of 
76-2-103, quoted below: 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or 
with intent or willfully"; 
"knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and 
"Criminal negligence or criminally 
negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
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with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct 
is reasonably certain to cause the result, 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he is aware of 
but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. (Emphasis added) 
Because extensive research has turned up no homicide 
prosecutions arising out of rattlesnake bites (There have been 
civil cases alleging negligence and there was a case where a 
rattlesnake was placed in the victim's mailbox, but the victim 
did not die so no homicide charge was involved) analogies to 
other situations must be used to provide guidance. 
I n
 State v. Dyer 671 P.2nd 142 (Utah, 1983) the 
defendant was convicted of negligent homicide for the shooting 
death of his girlfriend, and appealed claiming that he should 
have been acquitted. The defendant, his brother Robert, and the 
girlfriend were together at a private club drinking alcoholic 
beverages. Defendant was heavily intoxicated by the time they 
got home. Robert objected when defendant said he was taking the 
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car and going to his girlfriend's house tor the night, and an 
argument ensued in which Robert finally grabbed defendant by the 
throat and proceeded to hit and strangle him until he felt sorry 
for taking advantage of his intoxicated brother and let him go. 
In the meantime, the girlfriend had gone upstairs. Defendant 
went immediately to his bedroom, and Robert followed to the 
doorway. Robert saw defendant backing out of a closet with a '., 
.30-.30 caliber rifle in his hand. The rifle was fired, striking 
the door trame 5 feet above the floor and just two feet to the 
side of Robert. Unbeknown to either Robert or the defendant, the 
girlfriend had come downstairs and was standing outside the 
bedroom. After passing through the door frame, a fragment struck 
the girlfriend in the head and killed her. Robert called for 
emergency assistance. 
An information originally was filed charging the 
defendant with second degree murder under §76-5-203, as was done 
in this case. Five months later, however, by an amended 
information, the charge was reduced to manslaughter, and after a 
jury trial, defendant was found guilty of negligent homicide. 
At trial, Robert testified that his brother, the 
defendant, neither threatened him with the gun nor aimed it at 
him, and that he did not see or hear the gun being loaded. 
However, a neighbor testified that she heard profane, 
argumentative, and threatening language and that just before she 
heard the gunshot, one male voice said, distressfully, "Not that. 
Not that." Also, the police found, in an open drawer next to 
where defendant had been standing when the gun discharged, two 
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spent cartridges and a box of .30-.30 ammunition. When the 
police arrived, defendant at first lied and told them he and his 
brother had been discussing the deer hunt and admiring the gun 
when it accidentally discharged. 
On appeal, the Court analyzed the distinction between 
manslaughter and negligent homicide. The Court said that the 
mental state that must be proven ". . .to sustain a conviction of 
negligent homicide, is criminal negligence" and that the mental 
state that must be proven to sustain a conviction of reckless 
manslaughter is "recklessness". The Court then cited Section 
76-2-103(3) and (4) defining those mental states as follows: 
"A person engages in conduct: 
. . . . 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to the 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of 
his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The 
risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to the circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought 
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint." (Emphasis Added). 
The Court then concluded that: 
"The only difference between reckless and criminally 
negligent conduct is that under the former, one 
perceives a risk and consciously disregards it, whereas 
under the latter, one fails to even perceive the risk. 
The risk in both cases must be of such a degree that an 
ordinary person would not disregard or fail to 
recognize it. The distinction, then, is merely one of 
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the degree of perception of the risk." (Emphasis 
Added.) 
The Court adopted Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Boggess 
v. State (Utah, 1982) 655 P.2d 654 and held that: 
"The gravamen of the crime of negligent homicide is the 
same as that for reckless manslaughter. The only 
distinction between the two crimes is the mental state 
of 
In 
the 
one, 
defe 
the 
disregards 
ndant at the 
actor 
it; in 
time 
perceives 
the othe: 
the crime was cdmmitted. 
the risk but 
r, he simply 
unreasonably 
negligently 
fails to perceive the risk." (Emphasis Added) ._ 
In the instant case manslaughter is not warranted 
because it requires, at the minimum, that the appellant must be 
consciously (subjectively) aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of causing a death and that he consciously 
(subjectively) disregards that risk. Here, it is obvious that 
the appellant was not aware of any such risk, as demonstrated by 
his conduct in handling the snake (allowing it to hang loose 
around his own neck, kissing it, putting it down his pants etc.) 
(T. 394, T.310, T.27, T.399) and by his statements to the 
Churches, Willis Kelton and Mrs. Kirkwood and others, just prior, 
to the tragedy, that the snake was "mellow" and that it was not 
dangerous. (T. 26, T.48, T.84, T.474) Appellant was terribly 
wrong, as the result proves, but that does not change the fact 
that "subjectively" he was unaware of any such risk at the time. 
Appellant's failure to perceive the risk, as 
unreasonable as it may seem to ordinary persons (such as, 
perhaps, those who kept their distance while appellant was 
handling the snake), especially with the benefit of perfect 
hindsight, may have been criminally negligent but warrants no 
more than that. He was not consciously disregarding a 
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substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist 
or the result will occur as is necessary for manslaughter. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in a modified opinion after 
rehearing in the recent case of State v. Bryan 709 P. 2nd 257 
(Utah 1985) made it clear that a subjective test applies to a 
charge of manslaughter. In that case the defendant's 
manslaughter conviction was reversed and reduced to negligent 
homicide. There the Court said: 
"Under the criminal code, a defendant, to have acted 
with 'recklessness', must be consciously, and therefore 
subjectively, aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk of causing a death. See §76-2-103(3). 
. . . . 
Under the manslaughter statute, the defendant must have 
actually known of the risks; simply disregarding risks 
which he should have been aware of is not sufficient to 
sustain a conviction under that provision." (Emphasis 
Added). 
Likewise, in State v. Watts 675 P.2d 566 (Utah, 1983) 
the Court said that if the "manifestations of the defendant's 
conduct shows that he failed "to perceive the risk of death, 
§76-2-103(4)", that constitutes "criminal negligence"; while "his 
conscious awareness of, but equally conscious disregard for, the 
probable consequences of his conduct, §76-2-103(3)" constitutes 
manslaughter. 
Appellant had lived with the Kirkwood1s for three or 
four months prior to May 7, 1987 and had actually grown to love 
Stevie, as Mrs. Kirkwood acknowledged during trial (T. 40) and as 
the trial Judge found (Sentencing Transcript: 5 [see addendum]). 
Not only did he love Stevie, but as the evidence showed, 
defendant was a paramour of Mrs. Kirkwood. Although she was 
married, Mr. Kirkwood was a truck driver and was absent for long 
14 
periods of time. Appellant had no reason to harm either Mrs. 
Kirkwood or Stevie. There is not a scintilla of evidence that he 
acted with any intent or knowledge to cause bodily harm to them, 
much less death. 
As pointed out no reported cases of homicide 
prosecutions arising out of a snakebite have been found, so we 
must analogize the circumstances of this case to other types of 
homicide prosecutions* 
For example, if we compare carrying a snake around to 
carrying a firearm around, then plenty of cases are available for 
study. However, Appellant reminds the Court that firearms carry 
a much higher risk of death than rattlesnakes, so even the 
analogies weaken by comparison with this case. 
In Parker v. State 318 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) , 
Parker and the decedent were riding in a truck; the decedent was 
driving and Parker halt-cocked a pistol and waved it by the 
victim's head when it fired. The evidence showed there was no 
animosity between the two men and that they were cousins and 
friends. Parker's conviction of manslaughter was reversed. 
Again, in Re Jackson, 45 Ohio App. 2d 243, 74 Ohio Ops 
2d 384, 344 N.E.2d 162, a conviction of negligent homicide was 
upheld where the evidence showed that the accused picked up a gun 
without checking to see if it was loaded, jumped out a window and 
began chasing friends around the yard, then ran back into his 
house and faced two friends, with the gun still in his hand, at 
which time the gun went off, fatally wounding a friend. 
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To compare, Mr. Wessendorf picked up a snake he thought was 
harmless, or "unloaded", but perhaps he was just as negligent as 
the fellow who failed to check the gun. Also, by holding the 
snake close enough for it to strike Stevie, perhaps that is as 
negligent as holding a gun pointed at friends. The snake, like 
the gun, went off, and death resulted. 
Mr. Wessendorf did not intentionally provoke the snake 
to strike nor did he thrust it into Steviefs face in an attempt 
to make it strike, thereby distinguishing himself from cases 
where the gun, even though believed to be unloaded, is pointed or 
aimed and the trigger pulled. Those cases generally result in 
manslaughter verdicts. Appellant's culpability, if any, is less 
than that, or no more than negligent homicide, and should be less 
than in those gun cases where the weapon is aimed and the trigger 
pulled. For example, in Marasa v. State (1981, Fla App. D5) 394 
So.2d 544, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder 
under a Florida statute similar to Utah's "depraved indifference" 
statute, in that a second degree murder is the killing of a human 
being by "an act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a 
depraved mind regardless of human life" but without an intent to 
cause death. On appeal, his conviction was reduced to 
manslaughter on the grounds that the evidence was legally 
insufficient to support the murder conviction. 
That evidence showed that the defendant and others, 
including the victim, were having a drug and liquor party. The 
victim, obviously under the influence, stumbled as she returned 
from getting a drink of water. As she sat down on the couch, 
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someone said, "Hit her. She probably won't feel anything", 
referring to her "stoned or high" condition. Meanwhile, 
defendant, who had been showing a new gun after emptying, or so 
he apparently thought, the cylinder of all cartridges, said, "I 
have a better idea", and pointed the gun at her and pulled the 
trigger. The gun fired, killing her. 
Defendant's second degree murder conviction was 
reversed because the Court held that an act "evincing a depraved 
mind" is one which "is done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an 
evil intent" and "is of such a nature that the act itself 
indicates an indifference to human life", and found that: 
". . % we are bound to find the facts are legally 
insufficient to support the conviction in one very 
important, if not determinative, aspect. There is 
absolutely no evidence the appellant's actions were 
'done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil 
intent. 
The defendant attempted to rely on Parker, supra, to avoid even a 
manslaughter conviction, but the Court justified a manslaughter 
result by distinguishing Marasa from Parker by saying: 
"Here, the appellant thought he had unloaded the gun, 
but hs had not, he pulled the trigger purposely, 
apparently, and the gun was pointed at the victim when 
he pulled the trigger." (Emphasis Added). 
The instant case is distinguished from the Marasa case, 
in that there was not anything near the intentional pointing of a 
gun or in this case, a snake. 
In yet a third Florida case, McMullen v. State (1984, 
Fla. App. Dl) 444 So.2d 1063 a manslaughter conviction was held 
appropriate. (Incidentally, this defendant was also charged with 
second degree "depraved mind" murder.) There, the defendant 
attempted to shoot a can off the head of an intoxicated friend 
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(having been twice successful previously in this foolishness), 
but this time he hit his friend in the forehead. Because another 
friend had removed the clip, defendant thought the gun was 
unloaded on this third attempt, on which his friend had moved 
further away to "make it harder". The manslaughter conviction 
was affirmed because the Court noted the defendant deliberately 
aimed the gun and pulled the trigger. 
These four cases, Parker, Jackson, Marasa, and McMullin 
illustrate the distinction between negligent homicide and 
manslaughter. In Parker a manslaughter conviction was reversed 
and in Jackson it was determined to be negligent homicide where 
the circumstances showed that guns the defendants thought were 
"unloaded" went off (i.e., the trigger was not consciously 
pulled) when they were not being aimed. Marasa and McMullin, on 
the other hand, both resulted in manslaughter convictions where 
guns the defendants thought were "unloaded" were aimed and the 
trigger pulled. See also State v. Hardie (Iowa, 1878) 47 Iowa 
647 for a manslaughter result when a gun thought totally harmless 
(broken) was aimed and fired. 
We can compare those cases to the circumstances before 
the Court as follows: the snake is the gun; appellant's "taming" 
of the snake and his own experiences with it made him "think" it 
was "unloaded", as all these defendants "thought" the guns were 
unloaded; holding the snake is like holding a gun; agitating the 
snake or making it angry would be like aiming the gun—both 
having the potential to "go off"; and the snake striking is like 
the gun being fired. Appellant Wessendorf thought he had a 
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harmless snake (an unloaded gun) which he was holding when it 
unexpectedly struck (went off). This would amount to no more 
than negligent homicide as in Jackson, If Appellant had been 
agitating the snake and trying to make it bite (even though he 
thought it was harmless), that would be like aiming an "unloaded" 
gun and pulling the trigger, and would be manslaughter. 
This comparison comports with Utah's definition of 
"recklessly" and "criminal negligence" in Section 76-2-103(3) and 
(4) . A person who aims a gun and consciously pulls the trigger 
(even if he "thinks" it is unloaded) is consciously disregarding 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he might be wrong about 
the gun, and this is manslaughter. Appellant did not consciously 
"aim" the snake or try to make it strike. Appellant was holding 
a poisonous snake which we may say was dangerous like a gun and 
so perhaps he should have been aware that it may strike, or, like 
a gun, go off, so that his failure to perceive that risk by 
keeping the snake out of striking distance (like the failure to 
prevent a gun from being pointed towards a person in case it 
fires) could be criminal negligence. 
First, in the instant case, the trial judge, sitting 
without a jury erred in, at least, two respects. In rendering 
his judgment he erred in his interpretation of the law as 
applicable to the facts of this case, when he stated that the 
standard applicable in Utah is an objective standard and that it-
is the "reasonable man" standard. The court concluded that if it 
were a subjective standard, the legislature "...would not have 
included the language relating to the 'reasonable man' standard." 
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However, the legislature did not use the term 
"reasonable man" as the court suggested. What the legislature 
did say is: "...The risk must be of such a nature and degree that 
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all 
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." 
(Emphasis added). 
The legislature very specifically said it is the 
subjective view of the actor that determines his knowledge and 
intent. 
Additionally, in the Dyer case and others cited, supra, 
the Supreme Court of Utah has made it quite clear that a 
subjective not an objective standard applies, contrary to the 
trial court's statement: 
"The only difference between reckless 
(manslaughter) and criminally negligent 
conduct negligent homicide is that under the 
former, one perceives a risk and consciously 
disregards it, whereas under the latter, one 
fails to even perceive the risk. The risk in 
both cases must be of such a degree that an 
ordinary person would not disregard or fail 
to recognize it. The distinction, then, is 
merely one of the degree of perception of the 
risk." (Emphasis Added.) Dyer, Supra. 
Secondly, even while, the trial court was ruling that 
the objective test should be applied, he was finding that 
subjectively the appellant did not perceive the risk. See the 
following: 
After discussing the courts perception of the risk 
involved, the trial judge stated: 
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Did the defendant know his conduct 
created a grave risk of death to another? .1 
find that he did not. The definition of 
"knowing" as set out in our code is set out 
in 76-2-103 Subsection (2). The latter part 
of that sections says: "A person acts 
knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a 
result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
the result." 
In order to find that the defendant knew 
that his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another, I would have to find that 
he was reasonably certain that if he exposed 
that snake to Stevie, that she would be 
bitten and die. The evidence just doesn't 
support that finding. 
This is a subjective analysis which I 
base on the fasts that I've heard in the 
case. I'm convinced that the defendant 
subjectively believed that he had the snake 
calmed and somewhat under control, and that 
it would not bite. 
The defendant obviously had convinced 
himself, in spite of the warning that he had 
received to the contrary, that the snake was 
not dangerous, and that there was no grave 
risk of death to anyone under these 
circumstances. (Emphasis added) (Sentencing 
transcript, page 4-5) 
But after finding as a fact that appellant subjectively 
was not aware of the risk, the court turned around, and in ruling 
on the law, contradicted himself, saying "I further find that the 
evidence clearly shows that the defendant was aware of that risk. 
And therefore, his acts were reckless and as a result, he was 
guilty of manslaughter." (Sentencing transcript p.7) That was a 
direct condradiction to his earlier finding, (supra) 
The court stated among other things, in justifying his 
decision, that appellant, "...As opposed to knowing that he was 
going to cause a death, he was aware of a risk." In that 
statement, he inadvertantly made the very distinction between 
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manslaughter and negligent homicide and highlighted the error of 
his final decision. 
To use his apparent rationale, if one carries a gun, 
whether it be to hunt, for target practice, or whatever, or if he 
provides a ladder for someonefs use, etc. and no matter how 
accidently, someone is killed by that gun or climbing on that 
ladder, the person who supplies them, is guilty of manslaughter, 
because, as the trial court reasoned, the person providing them, 
is aware of a risk. A person getting into an automobile and 
driving it, would become subject to a manslaughter conviction, if 
no matter how accidently, someone is killed by that 
automobile—because the driver is aware of a risk. Guns, 
automobiles, ladders and a lot of other things we encounter in 
life present some degree of risk and most of us are aware of that 
risk. Being aware of a risk does not make us guilty of 
manslaughter just because someone dies by that instrumentality. 
There must be more, according to the Dyer and other cases cited 
herein. 
B. Appellant Was Not Aware of and Did Not Consciously 
Disgrgard a Substantial and Unjustifiable Risk. 
In this case the evidence is overwhelming that while 
defendant no doubt knew a snake could bite and that it had some 
degree of poisonous quality, he did not understand that it could 
or likely would be fatal. The court found this as a fact. 
Appellant had been bitten numerous times himself, he had seen 
T.V. documentaries that described the misconception that most 
people have of rattlesnakes and he had played with the snake for 
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several hours, allowing it to crawl over him, had kissed its 
head, had put it down his pants and all manner of things that 
clearly show he did not think it would bite, or if it did, that 
it would not be fatal. 
The facts are, as pointed out by the testimony of Mr. 
Glenn, that while rattlesnakes can be fatal, it is an extremely 
rare occurrence—less often than if bitten by a bee, probably 
less often than if one gets in an automobile and many other 
"accepted" things we do in life. Furthermore, if treated 
properly and in good time, there is no reason whatever for a 
rattlesnake bite to be fatal. 
In the instant case, appellant was one who sincerely 
believe he had a special way with animals, including snakes. See 
his account (T. 375-380) culminating in his reporting that he had 
not even gone to a hospital when had had himself been bitten by a 
rattlesnake as a child: 
I never even got sick. I heard you can get sick from 
it. But I didn't even—I never got sick. Other than a 
little swelling, and, you know, it hurt a little. But— 
Appellant clearly did not have the inordinate fear of 
snakes that the general populace usually has. (See.description by 
Glenn of an individual who when bitten, dashed his head against a 
rock until he died out of panic and fear of rattlesnakes.) 
(T.491) Appellant sincerely believed rattlesnakes are not as 
dangerous as most of us, who do not have either the knowledge or 
experience with snakes that he himself had, think they are. 
Of great importance, then is whether his belief is 
justified and is it reasonable? 
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Mr, James Glennf research serpentologist with the V.A. 
Medical Center in Salt Lake City, Utah, testified extensively 
about venemous snakes in the United States. The facts he 
recounted generally contradict the common perceptions that most 
"ordinary" people have of rattlesnakes and their toxcicity. A 
few of his quotes are listed but one must read his entire 
testimony to truly understand the relative, actual danger of 
rattlesnakes. 
And there are more venemous reptiles in 
the private homes by hobbyists—the amateur 
people interested in these animals—than 
there are in the institutions in the country. 
And I've told you that there's probably 30 or 
40 cobras in homes—30 or 40 more cobras in 
homes for each one that's in an institution 
in this country. (T.492) 
Speaking of the difference between a male and a female 
of the great basin rattlesnake (this was a male great basin 
rattlesnake. [T. 484; 10-11, T. 486; 9-11] ) 
Well, there's a little bit of 
difference. The males—usually the large 
males are generally very docile—very gentle. 
In fact, it's well known—the great basin 
rattlesnake and the midget faded—both in 
Utah--are well-known for their lack of 
irritable dispositions. Especially once 
they're taken out of the wild and captured 
and wallowed around for a while. It's very 
well-known among people. 
Mr. Glenn further pointed out that there are only 10 to 
15 deaths resulting from a total of seven or eight thousand 
rattlesnake bites in a year in the United States. (T. 492) That 
is a maximum of 2 tenths of one percent. Mr. Glenn also 
testified that even of those few deaths: 
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...In fact, most deaths have either been attributed 
to undertreatment or not getting the treatment on time. 
(T. 494) 
The Court must look at appellant in light of his 
knowledge and experience presented against the backdrop of the 
real danger that rattlesnakes pose, as opposed to the popular 
belief of that danger by those of us who have an almost h^strical 
fear of anything reptillian. 
Subsection (3) of 76-2-103 says that a person engages 
in conduct, constituitng manslaughter "...when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur." 
The evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly 
demonstrated that in actuality, the risk was not very substantial 
and unjustifiable, but, more importantly, appellant was certainly 
not aware of any substantial and unjustifiable risk and 
therefore, certainly did not consciously disregard such a risk. 
All of this, appellant knew and understood, or at 
least, thought he knew, and he did not perceive the actual danger 
as it turned out, did exist. 
Both Dr. Decaria (T.548, T.552, T.554 and T.555) and 
Dr. Dunford (T.531-532, T.b34, T.536-537) who examined him as 
forensic phsycologists testified that he was totally unaware of 
any danger to the child, or anyone else for that matter. 
On Page 534 of the transcript, Dr. Dunford summed up 
explicity the appellant's understanding and intention when he 
said: 
From his viewpoint and his background and the 
kinds of experiences he had had with snakes in 
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the past, I think it was totally reasonable for 
him (to not expect harm). 
Certainly the evidence adduced at trial supported those 
conclusions of Drs. Decaria and Dunford. 
While the mother of the child testified that appellant 
chased her with the snake and did other things that seemed to 
make the appellant out to be some sort of vicious or cruel 
individual, the fact is, she was grieved by the death of her 
child, was bitter and wanted a degree of revenge. Several other 
witnesses, Allen Shelley (T.468-472, T.474-475), Mrs Church (T. 
86, T.88-89, T.91) Mr. Halterman (T.99-100) all testified that 
appellant, in fact, did not engage in the kinds of activities 
that Mrs. Kirkwood accused him of doing. 
Unfortunately, after being pressed by the court to tell 
the truth, regardless of what it was, Ginger Hawkins, a friend of 
Mrs. Kirkwood, testified that Mrs. Kirkwood had asked her to lie 
in court for her. She stated, after being questioned by counsel 
for the state and the court as to why she seemed to be evasive 
about a certain question asked her: (T.444) 
A. Yes, there was. But there was also—after 
this all happened, Jeri (Mrs. Kirkwood) came to 
me and asked me to lie for her, and I couldn't. 
And so I don't know. I wasn't going to, but 
I don't want to see anybody—I don't like to see 
Jeri hurt. 
It is quite apparent that Mrs. Kirkwood did want to see 
appellant hurt at all costs in retribution for the death of her 
child, in spite of what the truth may have been. One can 
understand her grief in losing her child, but our system of 
jurisprudence cannot let that grief be the cause of a miscarriage 
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of justice. Because of her willingness to suborn perjury, her 
entire credibility about this matter is blemished. 
Every credible bit of evidence points toward an 
accident, possibly, and at most, an accident occassioned by the 
negligence of appellant, but certainly he did not unreasonably 
disregard a risk that he perceived and understood to exiist. 
II. THE DEATH OF THE CHILD WAS CAUSED BY THE 
INTERVENTING TREATMENT OR NEGLIGENCE OF THE TREATING PHYSICIAN 
AND SAID NEGLIGENCE SHOULD BE A DEFENSE TO APPELLANT. 
A. The Treating Physicians Underprescribed Antivenin 
and Said Lack of Antivenin Was the Proximate Cause of the Death 
of the Victim. 
The appellant submits that the treatment received by 
the deceased child upon her admission to the hospital was totally 
inadequate and but for the negligence of the treating physician 
the liklihood of her death was so extremely low that appellant 
cannot be held responsible tor her death. The trial court erred 
in not concluding and deciding that the said negligent treatment 
was a defense. 
Testimony of expert witnesses who examined the medicaj: 
records of the hospital concluded that at the most, one and 
vials of antivenin was administered to the child. Dr. Richard 
Charles Dart, an expert in the treatment of poisonous snakebites 
estimated the maximum amount administered to be one and h vials, 
while James Glenn, serpentologist and an expert who consults with 
the medical profession concerning venemous snakebite cases in 
Utah, estimated the maximum administered over a two hour period 
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before her death to be one and 1/3 vials of antivenin. Even Dr. 
Callahan, the treating physician, stated that it was indeed his 
plan to administer three vials over a period of a couple hours 
(T.117), but also admitted that not all of it was entirely used 
in that period of time. Confirming that the estimates of from one 
and one third to one and one half, to be accurate. (T.125) 
In fact, Dr. Callahan further admitted that, according 
to the instructions given the administering personnel, the three 
vials would not have actually been administered over a period of 
two hours, but rather over a period of four hours. (T.127) 
Dr. Dart, pointed out that the case according to the 
medical records, was determined to be a severe envenomation when 
the child was admitted to the hospital. (T.199) Though evasive 
about it, and in the face of the notations to the contrary in the 
medical record, the treating physician insisted that he only 
determined the envenomation to be severe after the death of the 
child. (T.120) Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that it was 
recognized as a severe envenomation when the child was first 
admitted to the hospital. (St. Exh. 3) If he did not recognize 
it, all the symptoms were there and the treating physicial should 
have recognized it as a severe envenomation, and it should have 
been treated as such. (T. 199) 
Dr. Callahan admitted that he had referred to the 
package insert (D. Exh. 17} which is included with every package 
of antivenin. (T.122) While he initially denied having 
referred, as well, to the Physician's Handbook during trial,on 
the cross examination, he agreed that he had admitted that he 
28 
had referred to the Physician's Handbook during the preliminary 
hearing and that, in fact, he had referred to it at the time of 
treatment. (T. 123-124) 
Dr. Richard Dart testified that upon the child being 
presented to the hospital emergency room with all the symptoms of 
a severe envenomation, at a minimum there should have been 
administered 10 vials over the first hour and then another 10 
vials over the second hour. (T.205) 
Dr. Callahan admitted that he had reviewed the Wyeth 
Laboratories1 insert sheet referred to above, as well as finally 
admitting he had consulted the Physician's Desk Book, and in 
fact, all reference sources indicated that a minimum of 10 vials 
and up to 15 vials should have been administered immediately! 
(T.124) The sources also, advised, even according to Dr. 
Callahan, as well as the other experts, that in the case of small 
children, the dosage should be increased. (T.131) (D.Exh. 17) 
Dr. Callahan admitted he knew that and also admitted that he did 
not do so. (T.13 2) 
The overwhelming weight of the evidence is that the 
treatment afforded the child was not just minimally inadequate, 
but woefully inadequate with absolutely no medical justification 
tor that inadequate treatment. Stevie did not suffer an 
anaphylactic shock to the antivenin, the only thing a physician 
needs to guard against in the administration of antivenin. 
(T.111-112) 
The child was taken from the emergency room to the 
intensive care unit and almost immediately died. (T.108) As the 
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child's condition appeared to become worse, the administration of 
antivenin was not increased, as it should have bean, (T.231) it 
was discontinued. (T195-196) 
B. The State Did Not Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
That the Cause of Death was Not as a Result of Improper 
Intubation of The Victim by the Treating Personnel, WhicK 
Resulted in Her Death. 
To compound the problems, Dr. Callahan, the treating 
physician insisted at trial that the child, after being admitted 
to the hospital, stabilized and began to improve with the initial 
treatment. (T.108) Dr. Callahan then reports that fairly 
suddenly, she had a respiratory arrest and then a cardiac 
standstill i.e. death. (T.108) 
As the medical records show (Sts. Exh.3) and the 
testimony confirmed, when the child's condition began to 
deteriorate, she was intubated to assist delivering oxygen to the 
lungs and almost immediately thereafter she died. (T145-146) 
A review of the medical records and according to Dr. 
Dart, it was "...striking that the patient was intubated and then 
nine minutes later, according to the documentation, had a cardiac 
arrest." The concern of Dr. Dart was that that was a real 
indication that the intubation may have been inserted 
incorrectly, possibly into the stomach rather then into the 
lungs, where it was supposed to have been placed for there to be 
that sudden death when in fact, Dr. Callahan had noted she was 
improving. That kind of improper intubation could cause death. 
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(T.208) Such incorrect intubation may be unusual, but it is not 
unknown and its occurence is well-documented. (T.210) 
Dr. Dart testified that the best way to determine if 
the tube is properly placed is to do an arterial blood gas test, 
as well as other, but less satisfactory, tests. (T.210) Such 
arterial blood gas tests were done in this case. The fiirst was 
done before the patient "decompensated" and showed a need for 
intubation. (T.210) The second was done 25 minutes after 
intubation was done, and showed that there were problems. A 
third was done in another 15 minutes after the second one. The 
taking of those two latter tests, according to Dr. Dart 
demonstrated that the treating physicians recognized that a 
problem existed. (T.212-213), and as Dr. Dart testified, that the 
problem could have very likely been improper intubation (T. 213) 
which as noted above could cause death. However, contrary to 
state law, according to Dr. Edwin Sweeney, State Medical 
Examiner, (T.163) the tube was removed by hospital personnel from 
the body of the child after its death and before shipment of the 
body to the lab for an autopsy so that it could not be determined 
if the intubation had been done correctly. (T.155) 
Dr. Sweeney also confirmed that improper intubation may 
well cause death, (T.164) but that, contrary to law, the tube had 
been removed so he could not tell at the autopsy whether it had 
been improperly placed. (T. 164) Nevertheless, the most accurate 
test, the blood gas tests which were done and the results 
recorded by the nurses (T.219) indicated the definite possibility 
that the intubation was improperly performed. (T.213) 
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Dr. Dartf an emergency room specialist, as well as a 
specialist in the treatment of venemoussnake bites, (T191-194) 
testified on cross-examination, that it is not likely that the 
child would have died, with proper treatment, considering the 
incidence of snakebites versus the number of deaths of 
snakebites. (T.225) While being unable to apply percentages to 
it, Dr. Dart testified that "...given aggressive doses of 
antivenin, the victims nearly always live. That includes some 
children in the opinion as well as adults." (T.226-227) If the 
high likelihood that the child was improperly intubated (and that 
fact covered up by the illegal removal of the tube before 
delivering the body for an autopsy) is added to the demonstrably 
and egregiously low dosages administered to the child by the 
treating physician, it is clear that the gross negligence of the 
treating physician caused the death of the child. 
The state, during the trial, tried to demonstrate, 
through the death certificate (St. Exh. 15) and the testimony of 
others that the cause of death was simply from a venemous snake-
bite. One cannot, of course, argue with that. What one can 
argue with is whether the venemous snakebite should have caused 
the death. Appellant submits that the evidence is clear that it 
should not have and that he is not responsible for the death of 
Stevie Kirkwood. 
An analogy which removes the case from the hysteria 
that accompanies even the mention of the word "rattlesnake" might 
be two children playing together and in their rough-housing, one 
suffers a small laceration on the finger. Unfortunately he 
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happens to be hemophiliac and the treating doctor mistakenly 
administers a blood-thinning drug rather than a blood-coagulating 
drugf and he dies. The cause of death is going to be described 
as resulting from the laceration. It would be absurd to 
attribute the cause of death to the child, however, who was 
playing with him and may even have been the instrument that 
inflicted the slight laceration. 
In the instant case, it is admitted that most people 
are deathly afraid of rattlesnakes and they become almost 
hysterical when one is near or they are bitten by one. The 
evidence adduced at this trial, however, shows that while they 
should be respected, they should not be so feared as they are, 
and it is this court's responsibility to see through the hysteria 
and the misinformation and the misperceptions that abound 
concerning reptiles, and deal with the case as it truly is, an 
accident. It may even have been an accident that was caused by 
negligence, but it should not have resulted in the death of the 
small child. 
To appellant's knowledge, the issue of such an 
intervening cause has not been decided in the State ot Utah by 
the courts of this state. Therefore it is a case of first 
impression and the law must be enunciated. 
40 Am Jur 2nd, 304, Homicide §13 points out: 
A person is not criminally responsible 
for a homicide unless his act can be said to 
be the cause of death. Although one may have 
feloniously assaulted, beaten, or wounded 
another, he is not to be deemed guilty of 
homicide where the death of such other person 
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results promimately from a would inflicted by 
a third person or from some other intervening 
cause, (Emphasis added) 
• • • 
It is to be noted that the tort 
liability concept of proximate cause is not a 
proper criterion of causation in a criminal 
homicide prosecution, which requires more 
direct causal connection to be shown then 
will suffice to ground a civil recovery. 
Section 17, page 308, states further: 
..•To warrant a conviction for homicide, 
the death must be the natural and probable 
consequence of the unlawful act, and not the 
result of an independent intervening cause in 
which the accused does not participate, and 
of the accused was not the proximate cause of 
the death for which he is being prosecuted, 
but that another cause intervened, with which 
he was in no way connected, and but for which 
death would not have occurred, such 
supervening cause is a good defense to the 
charge of homicide. 
The prosecution, of course, has argued in trial, that 
if the treatment is not the sole cause of the death or if there 
is no evidence that is is, the mistreatment is not a defense. 
Section 19 Of 40 Am Jur 2nd, is enlightening: 
Of course, it is established that the 
mal-treatment of a wound not in itself mortal 
or dangerous, the medicine administered, or 
the deceased own misconduct, and not the 
wound, is the whole cause of death, the 
person inflicting the wound will not be 
criminally responsible for homicide. There 
is some authority, moreover, for the 
proposition that if doubt exists as to the 
character of a wound, as to whether death is 
the result thereof or of improper or 
negligent treatment, the person inflicting 
the wound will be absolved from 
responsibility. (Emphasis added) 
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Generally speaking some cases which have been reported 
indicate that in order for there to be a defense, the 
mistreatment by the attending physician must be more than mere 
negligence, but rather gross or willful misconduct or negligence. 
However, as pointed out in 100 ALR2nd 774, the cases which find 
there is a defense arising out of mistreatment or negligence are 
usually not reported because the prosecution cannot appeal. In 
the instant case, the determination was made by the court acting 
without a jury and his decision my be reviewed by this court. 
The court found as a matter of law that "...nothing the ..doctors 
did or did not do caused Stevie's death." (Sentencing transcript 
page 7) The evidence does not support that conclusion. 
The question is, was the mistreatment or mal-treatment 
egregious enough to exonerate the appellant of the responsibility 
tor the death? 
Even the cases that find that mere negligence is 
insufficient to absolve the accused, usually preface their 
decisions on the term: 
"...Where a person inflicts upon another a 
wound which is calculated to endanger or 
destroy life, it is not a defense to a charge 
of homicide that the alleged victim's death 
was contributed to or cause by the negligence 
of the attending physicians or surgeons." See 
State v. Shaffer 574 P.2d 210. 
In the instant case, the court found that, 
The defendant obviously had convinced 
himself, in spite of the warnings that he had 
received to the contrary that the snake was 
not dangerous, and that there was no grave 
risk of death to anyone under these 
circumstances. (Sentencing Transcript, page 
5) 
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Consequently, he could not conceivably have "calculated" to 
endanger or destroy life. 
If the wound was not "calculated" to endanger or 
destroy life, the mistreatment or mal-treatment of the victim by 
the treating physicians may and should be a defense to the 
homicide counts against appellant. 
The most pertinent Utah case, though distinguishable, 
and not all together appropo of the instant case, which raises 
the issue of intervening cause, is State v. Velarde 734 P.2nd 449 
(Utah 1986) . 
In that case the defendant was accused of and convicted 
of 2nd degree murder arising out of a beating, allegedly with a 
stick or club. Subsequently, upon the physicians determining 
that he was "brain dead," they withdrew life support systems 
which were causing his lungs to function and his heart to beat. 
The defendant claimed that the removal of the support systems was 
an intervening cause of death. 
The Supreme Court noted; page 4 56: 
The state has the burden in a homicide 
case of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the death of the victim resulted 
proximately from some act or omission on the 
part of the defendant. If the injury 
inflicted contributes immediately to the 
death of the victim, the defendant is guilty 
of homicide. In this case, the State 
presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the injuries to 
Mclntyre's head, not removal of the life 
support systems, were the proximate cause of 
Mclntyre's death. (Emphasis added) 
The court further clarified that statement when it added, 
page 456: 
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However, even if the support systems 
were removed prematurely, defendant would 
still be responsible for Mclntyre's death 
s
^
n c e
 intervening medical error is not a 
defense to a defendant who has inflicted 
a mortal wound upon another. (Emphasis added) 
In that case, the wound inflicted upon the victim did 
and would have caused the death regardless of what medical 
treatment was or was not, or might have been provided. The 
defendant there did clearly inflict a "mortal wound." 
Consequently, the court ruled that removal of life support 
systems, even if prematurely done, would not be a defense to the 
accused. The defendant had indeed inflicted a "mortal" wound. 
The distinction in that case and this is a very great 
and significant distinction. In the instant case, the appellant 
had not inflicted a "mortal wound." The overwhelming weight of 
the evidence is that rattlesnake bites rarely cause death and 
almost never if properly treated within 30 minutes to an hour. 
Therefore, even if it had been a "calculated" infliction of the 
bite (which it was not) it was not a "mortal wound." (T.225; 
T.494; T.516) 
The court erred in not permitting additional expert 
testimony concerning the incidence and likelihood of death, if 
properly treated, which will be mentioned, hereinafter, but upon 
proffer, Mr. Glenn would have testified concerning the 
unlikelihood that the child would have died as a result of the 
snakebite if treated properly. (T.501-502) 
In this case, testimony admitted, and unrebutted, 
indicated that one and 1/3 to a maximum of one and H vial was 
administered over a period of two hours (see brief supra) but 
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that a minimum of 10 vials should have been administered within 
the first 30 minutes, (T.510) and another 10 vials within the 
next 30 minutes (T. 511) and possibly as much as 70 to 75 vials 
depending upon the condition of the patient. (T. 495) 
One cannot say that the evidence even came close to 
showing the appellant administered a "mortal" wound* 
Furthermore, it is clear beyond doubt that if that be the 
standard, the negligence of the treating physicians in this case 
was not merely negligence it was gross negligence. 
Mr. Glenn testified that he consults with the Poison 
Control Center and with physicians across the state, "because 
they know so little about the treatment of venemous snakebites." 
(T. 506-b07) Yet the treating physician did not contact The 
Poison Control Center or any experts in the field, eventhough 
admitting he had only treated "a couple of snakebits previously," 
even what he did do was contrary to the instructions on Exh. 17, 
the insert in the antivenin package not only available to him, 
but which he admits he read. 
The Velarde case, supra can and should be interpreted 
to hold that the only time the intervening negligence is not a 
defense is if the accused has inflicted a "mortal wound." If it 
is seen, however, to hold that intervening causes or negligence 
of the treating physician is never a defense, then it should be 
reconsidered in light of a case similar to the instant case. 
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The Court in this case ruled that: 
...in order for Mr. Wessendorf to be availed 
of any defense which would exonerate him from 
any allegations in this case relating to the 
medical treatment, he would have to show that 
the medical treatment was not simply 
negligent—not even grossly negligent—but he 
would have to show that the actions of the 
doctors were, in fact, the cause of death, 
that they were an intervening cause of death, 
and that they superseded his actions in the 
matter and terminated the causal relationship 
between what he did and the death. 
I think that's the standard in Utah. I 
think that's the standard in the majority of 
jurisdictions, and that's going to be the 
ruling of the Court. (T.500) 
Appellant submits that the court is in error and that that is not 
the standard in Utah. Appallant has found no cases other than the 
Velarde case in Utah and does not believe that a standard has 
been set, except as provided in that case. Appellant submits 
that that is not the standard enunciated by the Velarde case, but 
that if it is so interpreted by trial courts, the Velarde case 
needs to be revisited and clarified. The Velarde case plainly 
limits its holding to cases where the accused inflicts a "mortal 
wound" and that is not the case in this instance. 
Because of its ruling on this issue, the trial court 
prevented extensive evidence, that would have shown persuasively, 
that the wound was not mortal and that the treatment was the real 
cause of the death of the child in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the appellant 
should either, (1) be exonerated and found not quilty of causing 
the death of the deceased child on the grounds that there was an 
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intervening cause, i.e., inadequate and grossly negligent 
treatment by the treating physicians which caused the death of 
the child; or (2) that the law applicable to the facts of this 
case do not justify a conviction of manslaughter, because of 
appellant's lack of intent and knowledge of the risk of death and 
because he did net knowingly and intentionally disregard & known 
risk, of which he was consciously and subjectively aware, he was 
guilty at most only of Criminal Negligence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ / ^ day of 
.988 (Dew&&#. i; 
MficArthur Wright 
Attorney for Defendnat-Appelldnt 
Darrell Lawrence Wessendorf 
MAILING CERTIFICATE
 7/^/~ 
j a I hereby certify that on thec^f / day of October, 
1988, I mailed or delivered a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing document addressed to DAVID L. WILKINSON, Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
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ADDENDUM 
Section 76-5-205 reads as follows: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances. 
(2) Under Subsection (1)(b)
 f emotional 
disturbance does not include a condition 
resulting from mental illness as definded in 
Section 76-2-305. 
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or 
excuse under Subsection (a) (b), or the 
reasonable belief of the actor under 
Subsection (a)(c), shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under 
the then existing circumstances. 
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second 
degree. 
The Negligent Homicide section, 76-5-206, reads as 
follows: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or 
with intent or willfully"; 
"knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and 
"Criminal negligence or criminally 
negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct 
is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he is aware of 
but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. (Emphasis added) 
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THE COURT: We1 re back in session. Itfs now 10 
5 I minutes to 4:00 P.M. The defendant is present with his 
6 counsel, as is counsel for the State. 
7 Anything you want to take up before I 
8 announce my decision? 
9 MR. WRIGHT: I have nothing more at this time, 
10 Your Honor. 
11 MR. ROWE: Nothing, Your Honor, on behalf of the 
12 State. 
13 THE COURT: All right. 
14 This case has been described as a tragic set 
15 of events, and I want to underline that. I view this as a 
16 tragic set of events. I'm sure no matter what this court 
17 decides, there will be great dissatisfaction. 
18 Let me begin by analyzing the elements of 
19 second-degree murder. Under the law, second-degree murder 
20 I is defined by the following elements: 
21 That the defendant acted under circumstances 
22 evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, and he 
23 engaged in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
24 another and thereby causes the death of another., 
25 Those elements have been analyzed by our 
1 Supreme Court in the Bolsinger case and an additional 
2 element added. The Bolsinger elements are as follows: 
3 That the defendant engages in conduct which 
4 creates a grave risk of death to anotherf and that conduct 
5 results in the death of another, number one. 
6 Number two — and this is the additional 
7 element — that the defendant knew that his conduct or the 
8 circumstances surrounding his conduct created a grave risk 
9 of death to another. 
10 And then three, that the defendant acted 
11 under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
12 human life, which the Supreme Court has said is a 
13 qualitative judgment to be made by the trier of fact. 
14 As I analyze these elements, there certainly 
15 is no question about the defendant causing the death of 
16 another. And I'll speak more on that in a few minutes. 
17 Did he engage in conduct creating a grave 
18 risk of death to another? Counsel has argued that he did 
19 not. I find clearly that he did. 
20 Even though only one or two in a thousand 
21 snakebite victims die, that is clearly a grave risk of 
22 death. Under no circumstances would the law sanction 
23 exposing the populace to snakebites on the theory that one 
24 or two deaths per thousand is an acceptable risk. Those 
25 are unacceptable figures, and snakebite clearly creates a 
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grave risk of death, even if the odds for survival from 
that risk are better than one might enjoy from exposure to 
some other kinds of risks. 
The gravity of the risk in this case, of 
course, is escalated by the size of the snake, the size 
and age of the child, and the location on the child's body 
which the defendant exposed to the potential bite. 
I find that element is proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Did the defendant know his conduct created a 
grave risk of death to another? I find that he did not. 
The definition of "knowing" as set out in our 
code is set out in 76-2-103 Subsection (2). The latter 
part of that section says: "A person acts knowingly or 
with knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result." 
In order to find that the defendant knew that 
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1 calmed and somewhat under control, and that it would not 
2 bite. 
3 The defendant obviously had convinced 
4 himself, in spite of the warnings that he had received to 
5 the contrary, that the snake was not dangerous, and that 
6 there was no grave risk of death to anyone under these 
7 circumstances. 
8 As I've previously said, I find the defendant 
9 was wrong on that point. There certainly was a grave 
10 risk, and tragically he was wrong. But in view of the 
11 requirements set out in the State versus Bolsinger, that 
12 the defendant knew that his act was creating a grave risk 
13 of deathr I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
14 had that knowledge. 
15 The last element of second-degree murder is 
16 the defendants act evidenced a depraved indifference to 
17 human life. 
18 I believe that the defendant loved Stevie 
19 I Kirkwood; that he had genuine affection for other members 
20 *of her family; that he had no desire or intent to harm 
21 her. His conduct does not evidence depraved indifference, 
22 given these facts. 
23 In Bolsinger, our Supreme Court defines 
24 depraved indifference as follows: "To constitute depraved 
25 indifference, the act must be one which has been rather 
1 well-understood among common law to involve something more 
2 serious than recklessness, and there must be a knowing and 
3 doing of an uncalled-for act in callous disregard of the 
4 likely harmful effect on the victim, which is so heinous 
5 as to be equivalent to the specific intent to kill. And 
6 it must be characterized by unmitigated wickedness, 
7 extreme inhumanity, or acts exhibiting a high degree of 
8 wantonness." 
9 The acts of Mr. Wessendorf in this case do 
10 not sink to the level of those descriptions. 
11 I will now analyze manslaughter, a 
12 lesser-included offense in this case. 
13 The elements of manslaughter are that the 
14 defendant recklessly caused the death of another. Under 
15 76-2-103 Subsection (3) of our code, "recklessly11 is 
16 defined as follows: 
17 One, that the defendant is aware of a 
18 substantial and unjustifiable risk with respect to his 
19 conduct or the circumstances surrounding his conduct. 
20 Two, that he consciously disregards that 
21 risk. 
22 Three, the risk is such that its disregard 
23 constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
24 that an ordinary person would exercise. 
25 Four, as viewed from the defendants 
standpoint. 
There again is no question that the defendant 
caused the death of another. In this casef the experts 
all agree that the victim died of a rattlesnake bite. 
Although much has been made of the medical 
treatment provided the victimf all the experts agree that 
nothing the doctors did or did not do caused Stevie's 
death. It was clearly the act of the defendant in placing 
the snake close enough to Stevie to inflict the bitef that 
caused her death or at least was a concurrent cause of 
death. 
Was the defendant's act reckless? I find 
that the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there was a substantial and unjustifiable and even 
grave risk of death to Stevie in the defendant's act of 
placing an unrestrained rattlesnake on the shoulder of 
Stevie. 
You will recall in the defendant's 
testimony — brief testimony this afternoon — he 
indicated that he was holding the snake four or five 
inches below its head because he did not want it to feel 
restrained. 
I further find that the evidence clearly 
shows that the defendant was aware of that risk. As 
opposed to knowing that he was going to cause a death, he 
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was aware of a risk. 
And the element that I looked to to establish 
his awareness of that risk is that the defendant picked up 
the snake using a tire iron originally. He knew it was 
risky. The defendant transported the snake in a bag for 
the same reason. The defendant was warned by the Churches 
and others at the scene that the snake was dangerous and 
might bite or kill someone. 
Others at the scene were clearly apprehensive 
and exhibited fear of the snake. Mrs. Kirkwood refused to 
go near the snake or even enter her own home and chose to 
go in through a window rather than approach the defendant 
while he was holding the snake. The defendant kept the 
snakebite kit in his own truck to treat snake bites, 
indicating a clear awareness of a risk attendant upon 
snakebite. 
After the bite, the first thing the defendant 
did was slam the bathroom door — by his own testimony — 
and cut the fang mark in an attempt to remove the venom, 
again exhibiting 
snakebite. 
The 
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1
 There fs no question in my mind at all that 
2 the defendant was aware beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
3 risks that Stevie was put to resulting from the snakebite, 
4 even though he did not know that his act in placing the 
5 snake close to Stevie would most certainly result in her 
death, 
7 J Ifm also convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
8 that the defendant was aware that there was a substantial 
9 I and unjustifiable risk, in that the snake would bite. He 
10 was aware that rattlesnakes do bite. He's been bitten, 
11 himself, several times. He was aware that the snake 
12 exhibited coiling when animals such as dogs approached. 
13 He was aware that Stevie had a kitten in her arms when he 
14 exposed her to the snake. He was aware that others around 
15 were already upset by the presence of the snake and might 
16 do something that would startle the snake and cause it to 
17 strike or bite. 
18 I find the defendant consciously disregarded 
19 these risks as evidenced by his decision to place the 
20 snake in close proximity to Stevie in spite of the risks 
21 of which he was aware. 
22 It is uncontroverted in this case that the 
23 ordinary person in the defendant's standpoint — in other 
24 words, trying to decide "Do I expose this child to this 
25 snake or not?" — would consider the defendant's act of 
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placing the snake on the child fs shoulder -- which is his 
version of what happened — a gross deviation from the 
standard of care which a reasonable man would exercise. 
I want to note at this point that the 
defendant is bound by an objective standard and not a 
subjective one. Counsel has previously argued that the 
language as viewed from the act or standpoint involves 
some sort of a subjective test. Such is not the case. If 
the legislature had intended a subjective standardf they 
would not have included the language relating to the 
"reasonable man11 standard. Obviously if we take a 
reasonable man and then give him all the subjective 
features of the defendantr there's no use in using the 
"reasonable man" standard, we should simply state it as a 
subjective standard. By indicating a "reasonable man" 
standard, legislature was indicating they intended an 
objective test. 
And I find that a reasonable man using 
reasonable care in those circumstances would not have 
placed a snake — an unrestrained rattlesnake — in that 
proximity to a child. 
Because of my findings stated abovef I will 
not explore the elements of negligent homicide stated in 
the cases counsel have cited. The only difference between 
manslaughter and negligent homicide is the perception of 
1 the risk involved in the defendant's activity. 
2 1 have found that the defendant was aware of 
3 the risks and perceived those risks, and therefore the 
4 case clearly can't come under negligent homicide., 
5
 I find the defendant not guilty of 
6 second-degree murder as charged in the Information. I 
7 find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense 
8 I of manslaughter, a second-degree felony. 
9 Anything else we need to take up at this 
10 point? 
11 MR. ROWE: Yes, Your Honor. I believe it should be 
12 referred for a presentence report. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Wright, what is the defendant's 
14 position on a presentence report? 
15 MR. WRIGHT: Could I have a moment, Your Honor? 
16 THE COURT: Certainly. 
17 (Discussion off the record.) 
18 MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, we would concur in 
19 requesting a presentence report, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wessendorf, just let me 
21 explain briefly. You have the right to have a presentence 
22 report. That cannot be done without your concurrence, 
23 however. That report process takes about 30 days. 
24 During that time, the probation department 
25 will be contacting you and asking you some questions and 
•-^ ..ftT T T M rifi . RPR 
1 some information which they will use to prepare the 
2 I report. 
3 Do you agree that a presentence report should 
4 be prepared? 
5 J MR. WESSENDORF: Yesr sir. 
THE COURT: You should also know that there's the 
possibility in a case like this that the period for 
preparation of that report might extend beyond 30 days. 
Maybe to as much as 45 days. 
Are you willing to waive timer if 
appropriatef so that that report can be prepared if it 
takes 45 days? 
MR. WESSENDORF: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. I will refer the matter to 
Adult Probation and Parole for the preparation of a 
presentence report. 
We'll set the matter for sentencing — what 
is your feelingf Mr. Wright and Mr. Rowe? Obviously today 
being the 24thf it's not going to be done by the 17th of 
March. And the next date would be April the 11th. 
MR. ROWE: I believe April the 11th would be 
appropriate. 
MR. WRIGHT: Yesf sir. That's finef Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We will set the matter for sentencing 
on April llthr 1988. 
PMtf . (2 MrMMTfTM PCD r>nr» 
1 Andf Mr. Wessendorf, just to make sure youfre 
2 clear, are you willing to waive your right to be sentenced 
3 until that date? 
4 MR. WESSENDORF: Yes, sir. 
5
 THE COURT: All right. What is the bail set in 
6 this case? 
7 MR. ROWE: It's been set at $50,000. There's been 
8 no motion to reduce that. 
9 MR. WRIGHT: I think it's 100,000, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: All right. 
11 Any motion with regard to bail? 
12 MR. ROWE: I don't have any. 
13 THE COURT: Bail will remain as set, then, to 
14 guarantee the defendant's appearance. 
15 We'll see you back here on the 11th, 
16 Mr. Wessendorf. If you are released on bail, it's your 
17 obligation to be back here on April 11th at 9:30 in the 
18 morning for sentencing, without notice. If you don't 
19 appear, a warrant will be issued for your arrest. 
20 Any questions about that? 
21 MR. WESSENDORF: No, sir. 
22 THE COURT: Anything else we need to take up at 
23 this time? 
24 MR. ROWE: Nothing, Your Honor. 
25 MR. WRIGHT: Not at this time, Your Honor. 
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